Abstrucf-The integration of object-oriented programming concepts with databases is one of the most significant advances in the evelution of database systems. Many aspects of such a combination have been studied, but there are few models to provide security for this richly structured information.
I. INTRODUCTION HE integration of object-oriented programming concepts
T with databases is one of the most significant advances in the evolution of database systems, and several recent projects are developing object-oriented databases [3] , [ 111, [ 141. In fact, some commercial products have already appeared. Many aspects of this data model have been studied, but there is a need to develop ways to protect this richly structured information. In particular, some authorization mechanism is needed to restrict user access according to the security policies of the institution.
Authorization models for databases can be of two basic 'types: mandatory and discretionary. For nonmilitary environments discretionary models appear more practical, and here we are concemed with this type of model. For a survey of recent research on both types of models see [ 181. Most of the current models for authorization in database systems were developed for relational databases [7] , [9] . Object-oriented databases have a much richer semantic structure, and those models are not adequate. For example, some object-oriented models incorporate not just inheritance but relationship, aggregation, and composition associations [23] , [29] . These systems will be used in complex applications involving multiple different types of users and which are Manuscript received September 18, 1990; revised August 13, 1991, and January 6, 1992. possibly distributed. There is a need for new authorization models for object-oriented databases but only a few have been proposed [4] , [121, [131, [201-[221. We develop here an authorization model for object-oriented databases that consists of a set of policies, a structure for authorization rules, and algorithms to evaluate access requests against the authorization rules. In a realistic environment one must also consider security administration, i.e., the control of how authorization rules are created and deleted. We present here also a framework for this purpose and a decentralization strategy as well as an analysis of the effect of schema changes.
To better put our work in perspective we adopt the terminology of Kim's book [ 141, which defines the following basic concepts:
Object: A real-world entity that includes a unique identifier.
Attributes and methods:
The components of an object. The attributes describe the object, and the methods represent the operations which can be applied to an object.
Encapsulation:
The only way to access object attributes is through the methods in its interface. This access may be performed through messages or calls. Class: All objects with the same attributes and methods may be collected into a class. We can also say that objects are instances of a class. For emphasis sometimes we talk of object instances. Class structure: Classes are hierarchically structured based on the i s a association (generalization association). Subclasses inherit attributes and methods from their superclasses. If a class is allowed to have more than one superclass we talk of multiple inheritance. If one does not use encapsulation, we have a database where accesses may be defined in terms of read and write operations.
If one adds other semantic associations, e.g., relationships, composition, we have an object-oriented semantic database [28] , [29] . Our model applies to a reawwrite-based objectoriented database with multiple inheritance and can be easily extended to a semantic database. We use an abstraction of a model such as OSAM* [29] to illustrate our concepts.
The proposed model uses the concept of implied authorization [6] , where an authorization defined at some level of the class hierarchy implies rights (under some constraints) for the subclasses. In particular, we use the class inheritance structure to apply this implication and we define a set of policies based on this concept. These policies are implemented through evaluation algorithms. We consider the separation of administration from ownership an important concept, and we 10414347/94$04.00 0 1994 IEEE I 276 IEEE TRANSACI'IONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING, VOL. 6, NO. 2, APRIL 1994 develop a set of administrative policies to complement the implied access policies. To keep the length of this paper reasonable, we do not discuss here negative authorization, i.e., how to override implied rights, and access control for class instances. Both aspects have been considered in our model and are discussed elsewhere [lo] , [16] .
Other relevant models have been developed that differ from ours in the following ways (these differences are discussed in more detail in Section VII.
W. Kim and his group at MCC developed an authorization model for Orion, an object-oriented database system designed and implemented by them [14] , [20] , [21] , [22] . This system uses implied authorization along the granularity hierarchy, e.g., a read right for a class allows reading its object instances, and a write right for an object instance allows writing its attribute values. In contrast, our policies allow implied accesses along the class hierarchy. U. Kelter [12] , [13] and K. Dittrich [4] have developed models for databases using composite objects. Neither of their models uses implied authorization through the data class structuring, although Kelter uses implied authorization through user group structuring. In addition, all these models use the concept of ownership, and their administration structure is therefore quite different from ours.
Section I1 considers security policies and the structure of the authorization rules for an object-oriented system, while Section I11 discusses access request validation. Section IV develops an algorithm for access validation, and Section V extends this algorithm to handle complex queries and multiple inheritance. Section VI describes security administration. Section VI1 is a discussion of some modeling issues and a more detailed comparison to other models. The last section describes conclusions and directions for future work. The appendixes provide a pseudocode version of the algorithm of Section IV and a formal description of the policies of Section 11.
SECURITY POLICIES AND AUTHORIZATION RULES
A coherent set of security policies is needed as a guideline to write security rules to represent the access semantics of objectoriented systems. We discuss below our proposed policies.
A fundamental choice is between an open or a closed system. In an open system everything is accessible unless forbidden, while in a closed system we have the inverse situation. Security requires closed systems, while flexibility indicates open systems. In general, when security is an important objective, we should use a closed system. This means that accesses must be authorized explicitly or implicitly by some authorization rule. Fig. 1 illustrates a portion of a university database using the OSAM* model. (A few other concepts are introduced in Section 111). Class Person (P) has attributes SSN (Social Security number), Name, and maybe others. Classes Student (S) and Teacher (T) are subclasses of Person. The generic properties of Student and Teacher define Person through a generalization association (G in Fig. 1 ). Attribute Year (year of graduation)' is defined for Student and attribute Course for Teacher. Foreign In a previous work we developed the concept of implied authorization [6] . This was used mostly as a way to save in the storage of authorization rules and to provide a simpler picture to the security administrator. The idea was to propagate the validity of an authorization rule written at some level in a hierarchy to its descendants. The same concept can be applied to object-oriented systems through their hierarchic structure. We propose then the following authorization policies (a formal statement of these policies is given in Appendix B):
PI (inherited authorization): a user who has access to a class is allowed to have similar type of access in the corresponding subclasses to the attributes inherited from that class. P2 (class access): access to a complete class implies access to the attributes defined in that class as well as to attributes inherited from a higher class (but only to the class-relevant values of these attributes). If there is more than one ancestor (multiple inheritance) access is granted to the union of the inherited attributes. P3 (visibility): an attribute defined for a subclass is not accessible by accessing any of its superclasses.
In general, an authorization rule is a tuple (U, A, 0, p , f). which defines that subject or user U has authorization of type A (access type) to those Occurrences of object set 0 for which predicate p is true (note that the word object here is not used in the sense of object-oriented databases but represents any named entity). User U can grant the access right (0, A) if the copy flag f is true. Because this type of rules can represent most security policies they have been used to describe many of the authorization systems for relational databases [7] .
We make the authorization model more specific for our purposes by performing the following changes: An authorization rule is a triple ( V , A , A O ) where U is a user or user group, A is a set of access types, and A 0 is the set of attributes of the object to be accessed, i.e., A 0 = {Oi.al, Oi.az, . . e } . A rule can refer either to A 0 as a whole or to its individual components. Attribute ai must be defined for object Oi, or inherited by it. Predicates are needed only if we want to restrict instance access, and since this aspect is not considered here, we remove p from the rules. The copy flag will not be used for user access, e.g., users are not allowed to propagate their rights (with the exception of administrators, as we indicate below).
For example, consider the graph of Fig. 2 . Assume the following authorization rules are defined: ( F S A , Q l ) = ( F S A , Read, S.SSN)--Only foreign student SSNs are to be read (Policy P2).
(FSA, Q2) = ( F S A , Read, {FS.Visa, FS.SSN}) -Both foreign student SSNs and visas are to be read (Policy PZ).
Another issue is the use of negative authorization rules. Negative authorization rules are necessary to override implied access rights and are very useful to specify precisely the required authorization of some subjects. For example, the system described in [22] uses positive and negative authorizations: A subject may be denied access to an object either because it has no authorization for it or because it has a negative authorization on it. Negative authorization constraints are also required by the Orange book for security classes B3 and A1 [5] . We do not consider this aspect in this paper, but we have discussed it elsewhere [lo] .
Another dimension is ownership versus administration. In the first case users own and administer their data; in the second case the information belongs to the enterprise, users are given access to it to perform their functions and special users (administrators) control the structure and the use of the information. Since a database management system (DBMS) is used to support an enterprise, administration is a more logical choice for this case. This view is also supported by recent work on enterprise policies [19] . In this case, one may additionally want to allow some (or all) users to define private databases. To allow decentralization of administration we adopt the following policy:
Policy P4: Administrators can delegate their administration rights.
This means that the authorization rules for administrators are of the form (U, A , 0, f), where U is a security administrator,
A is a set of administration rights, 0 is a delegation unit, and f is the copy flag. This model is used in Section VI.
VALIDATION OF ACCESS REQUESTS
Access validation starts by extracting a data request from a query Or from an executing program. This request has a structure (U', A', O'), where U' is the subject (user, process) making the request, 0' is the requested entity, and A' is the requested access type. This request is compared with the authorization rules to decide if the request should be granted (totally or partially) or denied. In the case of systems without A Student Advisor (SA) could have access to SSNs of all students ( P I ) , but no access to their visas (P3); a Foreign Student Advisor ( F S A ) could have access to visas but only to SSNs of Foreign Students (P2).
For this example we define the following two queries, each of which is issued by S A and FSA.
Q1: Q2:
read SSN for all students read SSN and visa for all foreign students.
According to these policies, we expect the following behavior as a result of the evaluation of the indicated requests':
(SA, Q1) = (SA, Read, S. SSN)-All SSNs can be read (Policy PI).
( S A , Q2) = (SA, Read, {FS.Visa, FS.SSN}) -O n l y S S N s of foreign students are to be read and not their visas (Policy P3).
I Requests are shown here in the form (U, Q), where U is a subject and Q a query. For clarity we show also the expanded request.
. -structure, e.g., relational databases, this comparison implies finding a matching rule. In systems with a hierarchic structure such as the ones considered here, evaluation requires a search along the hierarchy for potentially authorizing rules.
To control the propagation of rules and to define boundaries for the validity of authorization rules we use the concept of security context. This is a set of object classes grouped together for security purposes. A security context may be equivalent in some cases to a conventional view or other partitions of the database schema. A security context defines a partially ordered set of object classes (in terms of the associations) that delimits the access for user queries, i.e., a data request is validated using the rules in a specific context. (In Section VI we define security context more precisely and discuss the relationship between the unit used for administrating the database-the schema context, and the unit used for security evaluation, i.e., the security context). Authorization rules are associated with specific security contexts. In Fig. 3 we show a more global picture of the university database. Security context C1 is defined to include classes Person, Student, Teacher, and Foreign Student, as well as their corresponding associations.
Validation of a user's request associated with this security context will only consider classes and associations within C1 (the portion in the dotted circle).
Another important issue for a validation mechanism is where to store the authorization rules. Authorization iules are considered part of the schema metadata, and their placement can affect the efficiency of request validation. Object-oriented databases are often distributed and usually do not have a central schema. Often, schema information including integrity and security rules is associated with the object classes themselves. Following this idea, authorization rules can be placed at special classes (e.g., a context root), at the class to which they refer (i.e., the class defined by the object part of the rule), or propagated throughout the hierarchy as discussed in [6] .
We consider first the following placement strategy for authorization rules. (In Section V a more general approach will be discussed. Consider now rules R1 and R2 of Section 11. According to this placement strategy, R1 must be placed at class Student. Similarly, R2 can only be placed at class Foreign Student.
IV. ACCESS REQUEST EVALUATION ALGORITHM
Queries are issued within a specific context. Whether this context is transparent to the users depends on the specific query language used by the database system. In our examples we assume contexts are transparent, and therefore they do not explicitly appear in the queries. A query graph is the subgraph of the security context defined by the classes that the query intends to access, and their corresponding associations [ 141. The query graphs for the two queries of Section I11 are shown in Fig. 4 . We also need the concept of query security graph.
For each node in the query graph we add all of its descendants (recursively) and all of its ancestors (recursively) until we reach the boundaries of the security context. The result is the query security graph. For example the query security graphs for queries Q1 and Q2 issued within SC1 are shown in Fig.  5 . (In this case, this is the same graph for both queries; for simplicity the attributes of each class are not shown.)
In order to present this algorithm one needs to assume some system architecture. Generally, access control can be enforced at different points in a DBMS, such as login time, compile time, database open time or run-time [7] . In this paper we assume a DBMS with a query facility where users issue queries in a high-level language such as OQL [l] . In such a system the most logical point to evaluate access is at compile time. The implied evaluation strategy is shown in Fig.  6 . The query compiler generates the query graph, the access evaluation algorithm uses the authorization rules to generate a new data structure that includes all the access restrictions, and the optimizer can take advantage of these restrictions when generating the search pattems. This is similar to query modification in the INGRES database system [27] , except that we apply our access control at lower level structures than INGRES, and our algorithm does not assume a central repository of access rules (see discussion on placement of rules in Section 111). It should be noted, however, that some access evaluation can be done only at execution time: this is, for example, the case with predicates. Even in this case, some work related to the policies can be done at compile time to save work at run time [lo] .
In this section, the algorithm assumes Placement Rule 1 and that the query security graph is a tree (a more general algorithm, which can handle acyclic graphs, is shown in the next section.)* For each node in the query graph the algorithm checks for authorization in the corresponding node in the query security graph. If it finds a rule authorizing all the requested access, it retums. Otherwise it looks for more general rules in the ancestor of the current node. If still not fully authorized, it looks for more restrictive rules in its descendant subtrees using, for example, a depth-first search procedure. The algorithm can be considered to be the embodiment of the policies defined earlier.
The evaluation algorithm is denoted as AUTH, and we use the following additional definitions for its description:
AT is the set of requested attributes. AT-yes is the set of attributes already authorized at a given QG is the query graph, SG is the query security graph. AUTH-UP and AUTHDOWN are procedures to traverse the tree.
AUTH may traverse the entire query security graph for each node of the query graph (the examples below assume a single query node). If the current query node contains access rules that completely authorize access, then the algorithm stops and sets the set AT to empty, and the set AT-yes equal to AT. If only partial authorization is found (i.e., only some of the attributes in AT are authorized), this is indicated by subtracting the authorized attributes from AT, and adding them to AT-yes. In this case, the security tree has to be traversed up and down looking for other authorizing rules. This is done by procedures AUTH-UP and AUTHDOWN, respectively.
AUTH-UP looks for rules authorizing attributes in the remaining set AT in all ancestors of the current node until the root of the SG. On the way up, it may not be possible to find access rules for all attributes because some of them are not known at higher level nodes, and according to Placement Strategy 1 they cannot be authorized there. Therefore, such attributes are temporarily eliminated from the set AT. If at any point the set AT becomes empty, the traversal up stops, though this may not indicate full authorization because of the eliminated attributes. If AUTH-UP did not get the full authorization for the set AT, then AUTHDOWN must be invoked. AUTHDOWN traverses the subtree rooted in the current node in a depth-first manner. AUTHDOWN must consider partial authorization, i.e., authorization can be given to a subclass even if access to the full class was requested (e.g., giving access to only Foreign Student in case access to Student was required). In order to find all the possible authorizations, all children of the current node must be searched, However, once partial authorization has been given to all attributes in AT, there is no need to search further down because no more authorization can be found.
After both procedures finish, either full authorization is given (AT is empty), or partial authorization is given by AT-yes. AT-yes is then used by the query evaluation algorithm to restrict access to authorized attributes only.
The pseudocode for this algorithm is given in Appendix A. Now let us see how the algorithm works on the four cases
The algorithm finds rule R1 and therefore gives SA access
The algorithm first looks at node FS and cannot find any rules. Then it looks at node S. Now it updates AT by removing attribute Visa, since it is not known at this node and therefore no rule can reference it. Now it finds the rule (SA, R, S.SSN), and since obviously S includes F S it allows access to all S S N s for foreign students but not to their visas.
Case 3: (FSA, Q l ) = (FSA, Read, S.SSN). The algorithm first looks at S and cannot find any rules.
Then it looks at P and cannot find any rules. Now it goes downwards and finds R2. It updates AT-yes with F S S S N and therefore allows access to S S N s of foreign students only.
The algorithm looks at F S , finds rule R2 and allows access to both SSNs and visas.
The above algorithm scans the entire security graph for each individual query node. Therefore, its worst-case complexity is O ( n m k ) where above.
to all SSNs. average number of rules in a security graph node.
However, because of our placement rule, many times a query will be authorized by only one or two security nodes, so its average complexity is much better. Furthermore, the search may be stopped for several reasons before the complete scan, as indicated in the algorithm. It is difficult to compute the average complexity because of the complex interaction between query structure, type of access rules, and their placement.
We have implemented the algorithm in Prolog and C and tested its operation on several examples that show its feasibility and ease of implementation.
In the next section we present an algorithm whose worstcase and time average behavior is better.
V. EXTENDED EVALUATION ALGORITHM
In Section IV, we presented an algorithm to evaluate security based on the above model and showed examples of several queries that are answered correctly by this algorithm. However, this algorithm has several limitations. First, it uses only the restrictive Placement Strategy 1. We may want to use a more general placement strategy:
(U,A,{Oi.al,Oi.a2--.}) can be placed at Oi or one of its ancestors.
This strategy may allow the centralization of most rules in one high-level node. This is more convenient for administration since it is similar to the central schema case. It may be more or less efficient for security checking depending upon the type of queries required. If most queries access high-level nodes, this will also make security checking more efficient.
A second aspect is algorithm efficiency. The earlier algorithm scans the entire security graph for each node of the query graph. For example, if the query graph contains two nodes and their corresponding security graphs overlap, we search portions of the same graph twice, which is obviously redundant.
The generalized algorithm presented next overcomes these two problems. Before presenting the algorithm we have to discuss in more detail some concepts.
Placement Strategy 2: An authorization rule
A. Query Graph, Attribute Tree, and A T j e s Tree
In the original algorithm we used three distinct concepts: Query graph: the set of nodes and their associations required to evaluate the query. Attribute Tree (AT): the query graph plus attributes to which explicit access is required. Authorized Attribute Tree (AT-Yes): the attribute tree with the specification of what kind of authorization was granted to each attribute. For the purposes of the generalized algorithm we unify these three distinct data structures into the AT-yes. This tree structure contains the original query structure with the attributes that are to be accessed as well as the results of the authorization algorithm.
Structurally, the new AT-yes is similar to the query graph; however, whenever there is a possibility for a partial access because of the existence of a son (or sons) node, we represent the son node explicitly in AT-yes and set a flag in its parent to indicate that the son is there for security checking only, and not because it appeared in the query. The content of a node in this new AT-yes is more involved. Each node contains information about the attributes that must be accessed at that node, specifically whethe the node (attribute) has full, partial, or no authorization. Also, each node has a list of sons, a flag that specifies whether the sons are needed for query purposes or just for security checking, and what kind of authorization each son has. We now present several examples of this AT-yes and discuss some policy problems associated with its generation.
Assume we have the database schema of Fig. 7 (note that in this figure all foreign students are only TAs; again we leave out the attributes for simplicity), and let us look at the following query:
Context TA*GRAD*RA Retrieve TA. name
This query is expressed in a language called OQL, which is used for OSAM* and is discussed in detail in [l]. The OQL context construct specifies a path that the query evaluator must follow. The * operator is basically a natural join. The meaning of the above query is: Retrieve names of all TAs who are also RAs. The AT-yes that results from the above query is shown in Fig. 8 . Note, the attribute name is propagated in AT-yes according to the inheritance hierarchy. In generating this data structure, the following policy decision was made.
Attributes that are required only by the query evaluation algorithm but are not explicitly requested by the user do not require explicit auth~rization.~ 3This policy is not named (as the ones in Section I1 and VI) since it belongs to a lower level, the level concerned with the actual strategy for authorization evaluation. It is not part of the logical security model, but it is intended to improve the algorithm performance.
This policy maximizes authorization at the expense of a higher risk of illegal information flow. This is explained next in more detail.
Let us look at the context of the query. How does a query evaluator check for the equality of TAs and RAs? Usually there is a unique surrogate or ''id associated with each object. Therefore, we assume that the query evaluation algorithm checks whether a TA is also an RA by comparing their unique identifiers. The question is whether the user should have an explicit authorization to the identifying attribute. Without such authorization we run the risk of illegal information flow. For example, the query "How many RAs are also TAs?" can be answered without the user having any access to TA or RA! Adding this authorization, on the other hand, for any attribute needed to make a connection, is very cumbersome. We therefore adopt here the policy that the query evaluation algorithm has full authorization for evaluating contexts on behalf of the user queries, and no explicit authorization of this context is required.
It is important to note that the authorization algorithm itself is independent of the way AT-yes was generated but will clearly give (or at least search for) more authorization if AT-yes contains more nodes or attributes.
B. The General Algorithm

assumptions.
The generalized AUTH algorithm makes the following 1) Access rules are placed according to Placement Strategy 2, which means that in general they will be placed above or at the node they reference 2 ) The query refers to a security context, and therefore its resultant query graph contains multiple nodes.
3) The graph used as input to and output of the authorization algorithm is the same as the AT-yes defined above. The results of the algorithm are reported as flags in the nodes of the AT-yes data structure. We now define the concepts of full and partial authorization. A node is fully authorized if all its attributes are fully authorized and all its query-related sons are also fully authorized (recursively).
A node is partially authorized if it is not fully authorized and at least one of its attributes or query-related sons is partially or fully authorized.
A node is not authorized if none of its attributes or sons is partially or fully authorized.
The algorithm retums the authorization of the top node as fully, partially, or not authorized. If it is fully authorized, then the query evaluator is notified and full access is given. If it is partially authorized, then the query evaluator uses the content of the AT-yes nodes to restrict access during query evaluation. If it is not authorized, then the query is rejected.
The algorithm works as follows: Starting at the root of the security graph it scans it in a depth-first search. For each node in the security graph (in short: security node) it checks the relevant parts of AT-yes against the access rules at that node. If at any point in the search full authorization is given to an AT-yes node, that node and all its sons will not be searched again. Otherwise, the same AT-yes node may be checked repeatedly against different security nodes-the reason being Placement Strategy 2-since we do not know where the relevant access rule is . However, an optimization of the search is performed when the security node and an AT-yes node are equivalent. In that case only the subtree of AT-yes rooted at the current node is checked and not the entire AT-yes tree. This is true recursively.
The major steps of the algorithm are as follows (the detailed algorithm is presented in [25]):
1)
2) for current security node do CHECK /*check current AT-yes node and update its flags accordingly*/ if this node is fully authorized then return else if current security node is above current AT-yes node set current security node to its root. set current AT-yes node to its root. then do if current security node has no sons then return eLe for each son of current security node do set current security node to son check authorization of current AT-yes node (step 2) end else if current security node is equivalent to current then do end AT-yes node if both have no sons then return else for each son of a security node and the corresponding son in AT-yes do set current security node and current AT-yes nodes check authorization of current AT-yes node (step 2) end end end
Procedure CHECK checks the authorization of each attribute and each child in the current AT-yes node and reports its results in the appropriate flags in the node. First, it attempts to find for each attribute some rule authorizing it in the current security node. If all attributes are authorized, and there are no children for this node, then this node is fully authorized and the results are reported upwards (this node will not be searched again.) Otherwise, each child is checked for authorization and results are entered in the corresponding flags. The final result in then reported upwards.
The following remarks are now appropriate. 1) This algorithm is intended to handle multiple-node queries. It also works for cases with multiple inheritance. However, only an acyclic graph structure is allowed. In this case the algorithm scans the entire security graph according to the partial order, and terminates. In case of a security graph without a common root, we apply AUTH to each of the roots separately as if they were the children of a fictitious common root. 2) Since the security graph is scanned from the top down, it is obvious that the search is optimized when rules are placed at high-level nodes (Placement Strategy 2).
C. Examples
In this section we show some examples of use of the This query refers to Fig. 7 , its AT-yes tree is shown in Fig.  8 , and the corresponding security graph is given in Fig. 9 Let us now, look at the F S A case. Assume Rule 2 is placed at TA. Then the 'algorithm searches in vain Person, Student, and Grad nodes. Then in TA it finds Rule 2, which fully authorizes F S , and therefore the algoriEhm does not go further down since FS is fully authorized. The AT-yes tree that results from this query is shown in Fig. 10 , and the corresponding security graph is the same as the one shown in Fig. 9 .
Let us also assume the following rules: 
Rule 3:
Assume that the above three rules are placed at Grad. Now assume that FSA, RSA, and GSA issue the same query shown above.
For F S A the algorithm first searches Person and Student in vain. When it comes to GRAD, it will fully authorize FS and partially authorize TA and GRAD. Now it will recursively search the two subtrees of AT-yes and will continue the search through TA and RA but will find nothing. The end result is that only foreign student names that satisfy the context requirements (i.e., they are both TAs and RAs) will be retrieved.
For RSA the algorithm will behave the same up to GRAD. Then at GRAD it will fully authorize RA and will not search the RA any more. It will still continue to search TA and FS in vain. The end result will be that only names and theses of research assistants who are also TAs will be retrieved, not the TAs class.
For GSA the algorithm will behave the same up to GRAD. Then at GRAD it will fully authorize both RA and TA and will not continue the search further, and the query will be answered fully. In this particular example we see the advantages of Placement Strategy 2 in saving search time.
D. Performance and Possible Improvements to the Algorithm
As explained above, the algorithm scans the security tree from top to bottom and checks all affected nodes in parallel. Its worst-case complexity is computed as follows.
Assume for simplicity that both the query and security graphs are binary trees having n and m nodes, respectively. Until we split the search of the security graph, the scan takes 2hmk, where h is approximately log(n) -log(m) (the difference in height of the two trees). When we split the security graph we search m + 2*m/2 + 4*m/4 +. . . for a total of m* log(rii). The total complexity is then: 0[2**(log(n) - As was shown in the examples, the algorithm may perform redundant searches in some cases. To reduce this redundant searching several improvements are possible. These improvements have to do with optimization or filtering, precompilation and rule placement.
1)
While constructing the security we a distributed database it may be useful sometimes to define any node that does not have administrator.
and ShKknt will be eliminated. Clearly, the schema DBA and an authorization DBA. A schema DBA has gaph be and the search be more efficient* In general, the efficiency Of may be dependent upon the way are organized within a node. 2) Rule precompilation. For every node in the Security context attach a pointer to the highest node in which relevant access rules exist. (This is similar to an inverted index). When generating the security graph from AT-yes, this information can be used to eliminate irrelevant nodes.
The result will be similar to filtering except that the work is done at rule definition time and not at query time.
define authorization rules; create/delete security contexts; delegate a security context: revoke a security context previously delegated.
3, straregy'
A starts down from a particular node of the tree. For example, GSA may have rules referencing GRAD, rules referencing RA, and
The specific administrative rights for a schema context are associated with schema changes such as --rules referencing TA. There is no advantage to store these rules above GRAD. So, if we change Placement Strategy 2 to recommend storing all rules at the highest create/delete classes; addhemove associations: create/delete/delegate/and revoke schema contexts.
-"relevant" node for each user, then we can use this information during the security graph construction. Note that this is somewhat different than precompilation since it is user dependent but the goal is the same, eliminating unnecessary nodes from the security graph. As in the precompilation case, more work must be done at ruledefinition time. With these improvements and similar ones, it is expected that the overhead of the authorization procedure for most queries will be reasonably small.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF AUTHORIZATION
From a security perspective a security context acts like a view. A query accessing the database via a security context can only access classes defined within that context.
B. Policies for Administration
The administrative structure we propose here is defined by a set of policies. We present h s t some policies to define units of administration and their delegation. This is followed by policies that define revocation and deletion of administrative units. Finally, we give a set of examples to illustrate the application of these policies.
Contexts and Delegation:
To simplify delegation of adminAs we indicated earlier, we must complete this model with a structure to manage the definition and manipulation of authorization rules. In this section we discuss administraistrative rights we define the following policy.
Policy API (Delegation Units): The classes included in a security context are a subset of the classes of a schema context. Because it is not very meaningful to have schema rights without security rights we adopt the following policy.
Policy AP2(Delegation Consistency) : Delegation of schema administration rights must be accompanied by delegation of security administration rights. Delegation of security context rights can be performed independently of schema rights. The delegator keeps the right to revoke or delete the delegated contexts.
In Fig. 11 , we show what happens when defining security contexts from an existing security context. Initially, D B A l has both schema and security rights on C1. After delegation DBAz receives only security rights on CZ. D B A l still keeps schema control on C1 but loses security control of CZ. A new security context Cb must be created by the system to reflect the fact that the delegator retains both schema and security control of the nondelegated part of the database. D B A l has the right to define schema contexts on C1, while DBAz has only security rights on security context CZ.
User access to the classes in a context is defined by Policy AP3.
Policy AP3(Context Access): A user query references a single security context, that is, the authorization algorithm checks only rules that are relevant to that context. Users who had access to a context can still reference it after the context has been subdivided.
The authorization rules associated with a context that has been divided are frozen, and they still can be used for data access. Queries that used to run on a context that has been divided will still run and get the same result. However, query processing is different because the query executes on two subcontexts and the query processor must combine the data to get the result. For example, in Fig. 11 queries can still run against C1. This provides users transparency to administrative changes in the system. For queries in a context that is merged with another one, they run the same, only in a larger context.
-1 -~ Revocation of contexts: For context revocation we use the following general policy:
Policy AP4(Revocation Consistency): Revocation of a security context will also demand a concurrent revocation of its corresponding schema context (if any), while revocation of schema contexts can be performed independently.
We also need more specific revocation policies. Policy AP5 (Weak Revocation): Revocation of a security context results in all its authorization rules being controlled by the revoking administrator. Similarly, revocation of a schema context retums control to the revoker. The revoked context is merged with the revoker's context (in most cases this is its complement). All the contexts that were directly under the revoked context in the hierarchy are now under the control of the revoker. ' Policy AP6 (Recursive Revocation): Revocation of a context results in all its descendants (delegated contexts) also being revoked. All the authorization rules (or schema descriptions) in the revoked contexts revert to the initial revoking administrator.
Deletion of contexts: Policy AP7 (Deletion cconsistency): Deletion of a schema context implies deletion of the corresponding security context and authorization rules. Deletion of a security context does not affect the corresponding schema context (if any).
Policy AP8 (Weak Deletion): Deletion of a context results in the context and its authorization rules (or schema descriptions) being deleted.
Policy AP9 (Recursive Deletion): Same as AP8 except that deletion is recursive, i.e., all descendants are deleted.
Illustration of the Effects of Delegation and Revocation: Now we show several examples to illustrate the delegation and revocation of administrative rights in the DBMS. We use Fig. 11 as reference, and we define the following notation:
Cschema: Schema Context. Csecurity :
Security Context.
C:
C.schema and C.security.
Sch-A:
Schema administrative rights.
Sec-A:
Security administrative rights.
Adm-A:
Sch-A U Sec-A. Action I: DBAl delegates part of C1.security (which consists of object classes {E, G, H , I}) to DBA2 with security administrative rights and the right to further delegate these rights.
Command: 0 create (C2.security, {E, G, H , I}, Sec-A).
0 delegate (DBA2, C2.security, Sec-A, True) (note that the complement of C2 in C1 will be created automatically by the system; it is denoted here as Ci).
Result:
State 2.
State 2: (DBA1, Cl.schema, Sch-A, Tke), (DBA1, Ci.security, Sec-A, True), (DBA1, C2.security, Revoke, False), (DBA2, C2.security, Sec-A, True).
Action 2:
In State 1 DBAl delegates part of C1.schema (i.e., (&schema) to DBA2 with schema administrative rights and without the right of further delegation. According to AP2, the system should inform DBAl that delegation of C2.schema must be accompanied by C2.security. If DBAl agrees, delegation happens as shown below (State 3); otherwise nothing is delegated. C2.security from DBA2 (which makes the system to reconstruct C1 by joining C2 and Ci). (Note the distribution of rights among administrators returns to its original state. It does not necessarily mean that the authorization state of the system is the same as before delegation-see Section VI-C.
Action 4:
In State 3, DBAl revokes schema rights on C2.schema from DBA2.
Command: 0 revoke (DBA2, Cz.schema, Sch-A). System:
Result:
Action 5: 0 create (Cl.schema, {C2.schema, Ch.schema}, Sch-A). 0 delete (C2.schema); delete (Ci.schema). State 2.
In State 3, DBAl revokes all administrative rights (Adm-A) on C2 from DBA2. (Another specific revocation could have the same effect according to the revocation consistency policy, that is, when DBAl revokes C2.security with Sec-A from DBA2, the system returns C2.schema with Sch-A rights to DBAl at the same time). Both cases are shown below. 
C . Effect of Delegation and Revocation on Authorization Rules
Generally, there are two schemes to store authorization rules in object-oriented databases. One method is to propagate all the implied rules at definition time as in [6]. The other is to store only the defined rules and to determine at access request time the effectice rule that applies to this request considering implied authorization. Even though rule propagation has an advantage in terms of evaluation time, it has disadvantages in terms of administration. This is especially true when security contexts are delegated and revoked. As will be shown below, in such a case propagated rules are especially affected. The advantage of the model of Section V is that the evaluation algorithm works whether rules are propagated or not. Therefore, in the following we will limit propagation to just the minimum necessary, and then we can use Placement Strategy 2 and the algorithm of Section V to evaluate access requests.
Considering both evaluation and administration aspects, we design rule propagation to be triggered by the creation of a new context. All rules related to the nodes along the border between the higher level context and the new context will be propagated to the new context. This can be done by a procedure that traverses the higher level context (i.e., the complement of the new context) checking all relevant rules according to the attributes of the border nodes. The effect of security context delegation can then be summarized by the following procedure. Assume administrator DBAl with administration rights in security context Cl delegates parts of it, e.g., C2, to administrator DBA2, the remaining part becoming Ch (as in Fig. 11 ). For simplicity, assume also that ' \ I As contexts are independent, domains defined by authorization rules in different contexts do not overlap. Deletion of a rule in one context does not affect the rules in another context even if that rule had been propagated from or to that context.
When revoking a security context, the propagated rules (p-rules) are not needed anymore. This is because their "ancestors" exist in the revoking security context. If such an ancestor 2) If O j E C;, but 3ok E C2 where ok is a descendant of O j and 0 1 , is a "root" in C2, then modify (as indicated below), place new rule in 0 1 , and denote it as p-rule (note that the old rule stays in the original form).
' end end end "Modify" implies to eliminate the nonrelevant values of the class from the rule. For example in Fig. 12 after delegation of the indicated context C2, R I at S would be modified to R', = (SA, Read, T A S S N ) and placed at T A , while R2 is moved from G to root of C2, which is T A , as shown in Fig. 13 .
Division of a context gives independence to the subcontexts. In principle, once a new context is created and delegated, all data values and authorization rules associated with that context should be propagated. The new context becomes an begin scan all nodes in revoked security context. for each p-rule if this rule is not marked "deleted" then remove it else change the rule to a negative authorization rule end This incidentally means that in a new context when deleting a p-rule these p -rules are not removed but just marked with a delete-flag. Note also that in Fig. 13 , R2 stayed in the same place since it is not a p-rule (although its location is not as "high" as before).
D. Effect of Schema Changes
Changes to the schema will affect the stored rules. One needs to look at all possible changes [2], but here we emphasize only the cases of greater interest. Fig. 14 shows an example of the effect of removing a generalization association. If the association between A and B is removed, all the rules in A or any of its ancestors that refer explicitly to objects in the subtree rooted at B must be modified and propagated to B before the association is removed, except that they are not denoted as p-rules.
This effect is also a strong argument against complete rule propagation since changes in the schema would produce changes to all the propagated rules below the point of change.
Deletion of a class has different effects depending on its position: deletion of the root of a tree, deletion of an intermediate node of a tree, and deletion of a leaf of a tree. 1) all rules that refer to B must be split and associated 2) all rules in B must be moved to either its ancestors or This is possible because of the placement rule used here and requires a search of the tree from where the attributes of B are known.
Deletion of a leaf implies a search and deletion for all the rules that explicitly refer to the corresponding object of the leaf (Fig. 17) .
with its children; to its corresponding children.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our inheritance policies are somewhat controversial. For example, W. Kim in [ 151 indicates that authorization inheritance along subclasses is undesirable since it implies that a user with an authorization on a class will get rights for classes created by different users. We partially agree with this statement; it seems wrong that a user can get access to classes he did not know would exist later. However, we have the following.
Policy P3 does not allow users to see attributes that are defined at a lower level. In our model classes are created only by administrators. If some administrator creates a subclass, he can decide if the users holding access to superclasses should still keep those rights or if they should be reformulated in a different way. If the subclass is created in a different subcontext than the one of its superclasses, there is no inheritance of rights. Because of this objection the MCC model [22] uses only implied access along granules, e.g., a right on a class is propagated to the instances of that class and to its subcomponents, but there is no right inheritance along the class structuring hierarchy.
The concept of ownership is another important difference between our model and the models of MCC, Kelter, and
Dittrich. In systems oriented to design environments one can think of designers creating their own files and sharing them with other users. This makes the user both a user of the dak and its administrator. In environments such as financial enterprises or educational institutions, the data really belongs to the institution and not to the users. It makes sense then to separate the functions of user and administrator. Of course, it is still possible for a specific individual to be both user and administrator, but most users wiIl have one or the other function. This approach contributes to security because of the possibility of checks and balances implied by separation of duties. Another advantage is the avoidance of circular grants, as in the case of ownership systems [9] . Using general negative rules, where any component can be negated, can be difficult to manage and can produce contradictions. Negation of only the access type, as done here and in the M,CC model, provides enough power without the extra complexity.
In general, the choice of policies for object-oriented databases is a controversial subject that depends on the type of application, the user environment, distribution, performance, and other considerations. Some general discussions on policies can be found in [13] , [161, [171, [191, and [261. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The authorization model we have developed consists of two parts: user access control and administration of authorization. Since each one deals with a different aspect of a database authorization system, they were considered separately. However, these are complementary aspects, the policies chosen for each one affects the other, and thus considerations must be given to their interrelationship and dependency.
For user access control, we have a set of policies that defines clearly the semantics of inheritance in an objectoriented database and how the authorizations are implied in the hierarchy. We provided a structure for authorization rules that can distinguish user rights from administrative rights and can express complex cases such as content-dependent access control and negative authorization (although the discussion of some of these aspects is given elsewhere [lo] ). We also developed algorithms for access request validation that consider implied authorizations in the inheritance hierarchy of objectoriented databases. The rule placement strategies are unique and important features of our model since they influence the strategy ,and performance of the validation process.
For authorization administration we proposed a set of policies with respect to unit of administration, delegation, and revocation. This scheme provides a strong support for decentralization and at the same time keeps centralized control through the power of revocation and deletion.
In summary, the uniqueness of our approach lies in the 1) Policies Pi-P3, which represent a position about the semantics of inheritance with respect to authorization; 2) Separation of administration of data from the use of data together with a specific set of policies to perform administrative functions; 3) Algorithms that embody the adopted policies. In particular, the rule placement strategies allow practical tradeoffs between performance and flexibility. These three aspects have been integrated in this model. However, with suitable modifications one could separate each feature and combine it with features from other models or extend it on its own. For example, policies P1-P3 could be used on their own without the administrative policies. This could be an ownership system, and additional policies would be necessary to control propagation of rights down following. the hierarchy. Another example could be to use a different approach to store authorization rules and modify the evaluation algorithms accordingly.
Future work includes the following. The database is represented by a connected directed acyclic b)
The group of vertices representing defined attributes is called defined end vertices (DEV). The group of vertices representing inherited attributes is called inherited end vertices (IEV).
Note: (DEV
The group of edges E is also divided into two distinct groups.
1) The group of edges from one middle vertex to another representing the inheritance connection between two classes is called generalization edges (GE).
2) The edges that go from a middle vertex to an end vertex representing the property of the end vertex (attribute) are called aggregation edges (AE).
In order to ensure that this graph will be connected, another vertex will be added to the MV group. This vertex will be called r o o t , and each middle vertex that does not have an edge to it will have a generalization edge from the root to it. If vil,...,Viki E EV vertices connected to v1 by the edges e i l , " -, e i k i E AE, respectively, (i = l . . . n -l), then there are IC, edges e,l,. . . , enkn E AE from w, to k, 41f there is a vertex U, E V a identical in name to another vertex U, E Vb, the two are combined into one vertex at database definition time, and the meaning of it will be taken from vJ-the defined vertex. Problem 1 : w2 and u3 do not have a common ancestor with respect to w , , , , .
B. Definitions Definition I (Father-Son
Whom does w 1 inherit wname from? Problem 2: v2 and w 3 have a common ancestor with respect to w,,,~, i.e., w, is identical to uJ in essence. It seems as if there is no problem here, but when authorization rules are discussed there is a need to decide from whom w 1 inherits These problems should be solved according to the database policies, and their solution should be known at databasedefinition time. From a security point of view, the problems are "solved" by Definition 5. 1) There is an edge eOk E G E from w, to w1. 2) There is an edge eo3 E AE from 210 to woJ where woJ E EV is a vertex identical in name and essence to w1,.
Note: Definition 5 states that there is a direct father; it does not show how it is determined. Definition 6 (An Ancestor with Respect to an Attribute): Let 2111, v21 E EV be two vertices representing the same attribute connected to 211,212 E MV by the edges e l l , e 2 1 E AE, respectively, such that w2 is a direct father of w 1 with respect to 2111.
An ancestor of 2 1 1 with respect to v11 is either a direct father of w 1 with respect to 2111, i.e., 212, or an ancestor of wp with respect to 7121 (a recursive definition).
Definition 7 (A User): A user is a person or a group of people defined by an identifier U,, which is allowed access in some particular manner to parts of the database.
The group of all users will be called A1Z-U. All-U = { UlU2,. . . , U,} for some n.
Definition 8 (Access to the Database):
An access is a set of the access types allowed in a vertex. The existing access types are read ( R ) , write (W), and no\-access. The group of all possible access types will be called AR. A R = { R , W } .
Definition 9 (Authorization Rule):
An authorization rule is a tuple with three elements of the form (U, A, w) such that U E All-U, A R 3 A , w E V , which authorizes the user U to access the vertex w according to the access types defined in A. If w E M V , then each vertex vi E EV connected to it can be accessed by user U in the ways defined in A. The group of all authorization rules will be called AU. 
